I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
(a) It's a hell of a lot easier to fight a defensive war than an offensive one (b) Russia's population pyramid looked rather different in 1939 than it does in 2023 (c) Russia was only able to fight then because it was supplied by the West
I expected Russia to win the war. Or at least, I expected them to occupy the country East of the Dnieper. And that, I thought, would be the easy bit. Because the initial invasion is usually the easy bit, and it is the occupation - and the slow attrition that comes with it - that kills you.
The nation, both Putin and the population, doesn't seem to be in the mood to call it a day, indeed they believe that the war is an existential fight for their country. That puts the boot on the other foot in your defensive/offensive dynamic because to Russians, they are fighting for their existence.
And I am not sure of the precedent of any country running out of soldiers in war although perhaps Germany in 1945 was an example of this. But Russia is enormous, both its economy and its population and population pyramids aside I can't see them running out of troops in this instance.
My point is there have been umpteen posts forecasting the defeat of Russia (even if anyone knew what they meant by that) for one reason or another and I am wary of such forecasts.
IIRC France ran out of men to conscript at the end of the Napoleonic wars.
Interesting. And according to I think @Malmesbury someone ran out of soldiers in WWI.
We shall see whether Russia in this case runs out of soldiers because of the population pyramid.
I’d like it to be true, but I don’t see how Russia loses this “outright”
Putin has successfully made the war existential. Therefore Russian defeat in Ukraine is the conquest of Russia. That cannot happen because Russian is a great power WITH NUKES. Even if Putin is toppled no replacement will be allowed to negotiate “surrender”
This is Korean War 2.0. Quagmire and Armistice beckons, eventually
Pretty much. Apart from anything else, Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder.
It all ends with partition along a line of control as per Kashmir, with neither side recognising the territory held by the other de jure, but an accommodation being reached de facto. The 80% of Ukraine that remains unoccupied will then be pumped so full of cash and weapons that the cost of trying to resume the war of conquest at some point in the future will be too steep for Putin or his successors to stomach.
This state having been reached, the key challenge will then be to maintain a degree of unity with respect to the ostracism of Russia. Fundamentally, this is a fascist state with a fascist leadership and an overwhelmingly fascist-sympathising population: the existence of a handful of doomed internal dissidents and Pussy Riot does nothing to alter the fact that most Russians back both Putin and his imperial ambitions to the hilt. There will have to be a lot of determined diplomacy to prevent potential backsliders like Italy and Germany from trying to resume antebellum positions on trade and appeasement.
"Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder."
I'm far from convinced that's the case. Look at the Second World War: Germany had over 700,000 men in the Caucus in January 1943; the Soviets had a million. And that was just one front for both. The Ukraine war might be the largest land war we've seen for some years, but it's tiny compared to past wars.
Russia is, and wants to remain, a modern society. The modern world requires so many more skilled people than war did 80 years ago: there are loads of jobs that simply did not exist, but are critical to society and to war. We can't just send the Bevan Boys in to perform them as it takes years to learn the skills.
Then there are the demographic issues mentioned below.
The same also applies to Ukraine, as it happens.
I think this is spot on.
The pool of "talent" for Russia to draw upon is:
Men, aged 17 to 30, in decent physical shape, who don't have important jobs that are required for the war effort, and who haven't fled the country.
Russia's population pyramid is narrowest in the 20-24 (i.e. the prime fighting age) segment.
And a significant chunk of that group has already been called up, has been killed or injured, has fled, or is otherwise unsuitable for fighting.
The Russians have been enlisting prisoners, people who are HIV+ or have tuberculosis. These are not the actions of a country with unlimited cannon fodder.
And even if they did have another million men (which is half the number of Russian men in their early twenties), if they are unsupported, unsupplied, barely trained, and attacking entrenched defenders with Western weapons, then it's not going to end well for them.
At some point, the flow of shells dries up. At some point, too many artillery pieces have been destroyed by HIMARS or just by the warping of barrels from constant firing. At some point, going to the front is considered such a death sentence, that people would fancy their chances fighting the internal police.
At some point, waging offensive war no longer becomes an option for the Russians. Now, it may be they can then defend their positions in a long war of attrition and frozen fronts. Or it may be that long range artillery makes those dug in positions far from Russia and far from working railheads impossible to supply.
And then the war stops, one way or another.
And at that point Putin (or his even madder successor) drops a test nuke over the Black Sea and says Peace Now
Then what? We would agree to a peace, at that point. Probably something like Korea
For your preferred outcome to play out you must assume that Russian will NEVER use nukes even when faced with humiliating defeat. A very very dangerous assumption
It's not my "preferred outcome", I'm just pointing out the fallacy of the "Russia has unlimited resources to throw into the conflict" brigade, of which you are a member.
Russia does not have unlimited resources.
The fact is we're all guessing, and at times we've all been wrong. If I tally my beliefs vs what actually happened:
- I expected the invasion and wasn't surprised by that - I thought Ukraine would be overrun in days and was surprised by their resilience - When Russia withdrew from Kiev I expected stalemate but actually Russia went on to capture Severodonetsk - I was surprised like most by the rapid Ukrainian advances in the NE but not surprised when Kherson fell - But then unpleasantly surprised at how Russia fought back and started to advance again in the East
Now most people expect stalemate but a few expect a successful Ukrainian offensive in spring. It's really too difficult to tell.
It is very unpredictable. I don't know what will happen and don't know what is for the best (which I define as the course that minimises human suffering).
Curiously, PB.com is full of people who do know what will happen and are very convinced that they are right.
Perhaps a little waspish. this is a betting site and we explore things from the point of view of the probabilities.
FWIW I have earned my modest living through analyzing the politics, economics and businesses (and history) of the Central and Eastern Euopean region for the past thirty five years, and I do speak some of the languages. Also, of course I have been largely based in Tallinn for the past decade. Perhaps I may sound more assertive in my conclusions than my more academic colleagues would permit themselves, but on the other hand I am paid to have an opinion.
While the short character limit does not permit too many caveats in exploring what is a very complicated situation, you are right to remind me that I maybe don´t show enough of my working to explain myself properly.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
I remember PB telling us that Russia was going to run out of missiles in mid September
“Large-scale Russian missile attacks ‘reconnaissance’ for future offensive Ukrainian military says 61 out of 70 cruise missiles shot down as Black Sea launches seen as test of defence infrastructure”
If they elect Forbes they guarantee years of this. They would be mad to do so
Go for Regan
I mean I wouldn't vote for her but there are 1,000 reasons why someone might disagree with, say, sex outside marriage. Essentially Black is saying that religious belief is not a valid one of those. For everyone who voted against gay marriage is Black saying each should be questioned as to their motives and those she deems invalid should be discounted.
I’m not arguing the merits of the case (I probably agree with you) I’m merely pointing out that Mhairi Black is a pretty notable figure in the SNP and that is an acutely damaging attack by her, on Forbes, not least because Black really knows how to build a cumulative Twitter thread (an important skill, these days)
If the Nats elect Forbes they can expect much more of this, all the time. Forbes as FM likely guarantees permanent civil/culture war in the party. She can’t row back from what she has said are avowed fundamental religious beliefs
Intderesting comment re Twitter thread ability. Any other pols good at that, just ouyt of interest, please? Don't need a catalogue, just an example or two.
Actually no. None springs to mind. Which is an interesting thing in itself
Mhairi Black is young and has grown up with social media like Twitter. She knows how to use it really well. QED
Thank you.
Twitter says that brutal tweet-thread has been seen by 650,000 people. That’s huge
By contrast, how many people read an article in the Scotsman, or the National, how many Scots even watch politics on STV?
This is the enormous potency of social media, and Mhairi Black seems particularly good at deploying it
Many more people have seen Kemi Badenoch's excellent defence of Forbes.
I’d like it to be true, but I don’t see how Russia loses this “outright”
Putin has successfully made the war existential. Therefore Russian defeat in Ukraine is the conquest of Russia. That cannot happen because Russian is a great power WITH NUKES. Even if Putin is toppled no replacement will be allowed to negotiate “surrender”
This is Korean War 2.0. Quagmire and Armistice beckons, eventually
Pretty much. Apart from anything else, Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder.
It all ends with partition along a line of control as per Kashmir, with neither side recognising the territory held by the other de jure, but an accommodation being reached de facto. The 80% of Ukraine that remains unoccupied will then be pumped so full of cash and weapons that the cost of trying to resume the war of conquest at some point in the future will be too steep for Putin or his successors to stomach.
This state having been reached, the key challenge will then be to maintain a degree of unity with respect to the ostracism of Russia. Fundamentally, this is a fascist state with a fascist leadership and an overwhelmingly fascist-sympathising population: the existence of a handful of doomed internal dissidents and Pussy Riot does nothing to alter the fact that most Russians back both Putin and his imperial ambitions to the hilt. There will have to be a lot of determined diplomacy to prevent potential backsliders like Italy and Germany from trying to resume antebellum positions on trade and appeasement.
"Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder."
I'm far from convinced that's the case. Look at the Second World War: Germany had over 700,000 men in the Caucus in January 1943; the Soviets had a million. And that was just one front for both. The Ukraine war might be the largest land war we've seen for some years, but it's tiny compared to past wars.
Russia is, and wants to remain, a modern society. The modern world requires so many more skilled people than war did 80 years ago: there are loads of jobs that simply did not exist, but are critical to society and to war. We can't just send the Bevan Boys in to perform them as it takes years to learn the skills.
Then there are the demographic issues mentioned below.
The same also applies to Ukraine, as it happens.
I think this is spot on.
The pool of "talent" for Russia to draw upon is:
Men, aged 17 to 30, in decent physical shape, who don't have important jobs that are required for the war effort, and who haven't fled the country.
Russia's population pyramid is narrowest in the 20-24 (i.e. the prime fighting age) segment.
And a significant chunk of that group has already been called up, has been killed or injured, has fled, or is otherwise unsuitable for fighting.
The Russians have been enlisting prisoners, people who are HIV+ or have tuberculosis. These are not the actions of a country with unlimited cannon fodder.
And even if they did have another million men (which is half the number of Russian men in their early twenties), if they are unsupported, unsupplied, barely trained, and attacking entrenched defenders with Western weapons, then it's not going to end well for them.
At some point, the flow of shells dries up. At some point, too many artillery pieces have been destroyed by HIMARS or just by the warping of barrels from constant firing. At some point, going to the front is considered such a death sentence, that people would fancy their chances fighting the internal police.
At some point, waging offensive war no longer becomes an option for the Russians. Now, it may be they can then defend their positions in a long war of attrition and frozen fronts. Or it may be that long range artillery makes those dug in positions far from Russia and far from working railheads impossible to supply.
And then the war stops, one way or another.
OTOH the Russian population is enormous. Those statistics suggest there are over 12 million men in their thirties alone, most of whom will not be in the limited number of categories (those in reserved occupations, politically well connected, fled abroad, or part of the internal security apparatus,) that would be exempt from being called up and shipped off to be used as target practice by the Ukrainian Army. Forcible conscription, brutalising recruits and using them up to bleed the enemy white is all par for the course in the Russian way of waging war, as is an acceptance of almost limitless suffering on the part of the general population. A wider mobilisation might precipitate a mass revolt, but there's no sign of that happening any time in the near future.
But those troops need supplies: they need guns, and shells, and artillery pieces, and uniforms, and food, and fuel, and vehicles to drive in, and people to drive those vehicles.
You can't just pull out the entire male population and send them to the front line.
At the same time Russia is bleeding front line troops, they also need to divert resources into supplying them.
You send them into battle with antique weapons. You beg, buy, borrow and smuggle from the Iranians, the North Koreans, and (through third party dealers, with tacit acquiescence from the state,) the Chinese. You ramp domestic production. You don't particularly care if the Ukrainians bleed you at a rate of five or ten to one - your own people are expendable - so long as the Ukrainians start running out of men, or willpower, or Western patience, first. If you're Putin and you want to live, you don't give in.
Russia has two big advantages. They have a lot more people than Ukraine, and there's no prospect of Ukraine launching a successful conquest of Russia and imposing a settlement by force. So, they keep going. I hope and believe that Russia is too weak to win outright, but I also think that the Russian leadership has too much invested in this enterprise, and too much in the way of resources, to be beaten outright and ejected from occupied Ukraine. Thus, the logical endpoint is some kind of stalemate. The only question is where the ceasefire line ends up being drawn.
That strategy was ultimately a failure for Russia when it fought Japan, and in WWI.
And successful against Napoleon and Hitler - more important wars (for Russia)
If they elect Forbes they guarantee years of this. They would be mad to do so
Go for Regan
I mean I wouldn't vote for her but there are 1,000 reasons why someone might disagree with, say, sex outside marriage. Essentially Black is saying that religious belief is not a valid one of those. For everyone who voted against gay marriage is Black saying each should be questioned as to their motives and those she deems invalid should be discounted.
I’m not arguing the merits of the case (I probably agree with you) I’m merely pointing out that Mhairi Black is a pretty notable figure in the SNP and that is an acutely damaging attack by her, on Forbes, not least because Black really knows how to build a cumulative Twitter thread (an important skill, these days)
If the Nats elect Forbes they can expect much more of this, all the time. Forbes as FM likely guarantees permanent civil/culture war in the party. She can’t row back from what she has said are avowed fundamental religious beliefs
Intderesting comment re Twitter thread ability. Any other pols good at that, just ouyt of interest, please? Don't need a catalogue, just an example or two.
Actually no. None springs to mind. Which is an interesting thing in itself
Mhairi Black is young and has grown up with social media like Twitter. She knows how to use it really well. QED
Thank you.
Twitter says that brutal tweet-thread has been seen by 650,000 people. That’s huge
By contrast, how many people read an article in the Scotsman, or the National, how many Scots even watch politics on STV?
This is the enormous potency of social media, and Mhairi Black seems particularly good at deploying it
Many more people have seen Kemi Badenoch's excellent defence of Forbes.
SNP supporter pictured in photos with SNP politicians? Doesn't sound like a big story. There must be many thousands of supporters who have selfies of themselves with politicians they've managed to get close to.* Some of them will be oddballs or worse.
* didn't HYUFD post one of him with Michael Gove after he spotted Gove in the street somewhere?
ETA: HYUFD as an example of selfie with politician, not suggesting he's an oddball or worse (he's normal enough, I think - or, at least, as the medical term goes, 'normal for PB' )
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
(a) It's a hell of a lot easier to fight a defensive war than an offensive one (b) Russia's population pyramid looked rather different in 1939 than it does in 2023 (c) Russia was only able to fight then because it was supplied by the West
I expected Russia to win the war. Or at least, I expected them to occupy the country East of the Dnieper. And that, I thought, would be the easy bit. Because the initial invasion is usually the easy bit, and it is the occupation - and the slow attrition that comes with it - that kills you.
The nation, both Putin and the population, doesn't seem to be in the mood to call it a day, indeed they believe that the war is an existential fight for their country. That puts the boot on the other foot in your defensive/offensive dynamic because to Russians, they are fighting for their existence.
And I am not sure of the precedent of any country running out of soldiers in war although perhaps Germany in 1945 was an example of this. But Russia is enormous, both its economy and its population and population pyramids aside I can't see them running out of troops in this instance.
My point is there have been umpteen posts forecasting the defeat of Russia (even if anyone knew what they meant by that) for one reason or another and I am wary of such forecasts.
IIRC France ran out of men to conscript at the end of the Napoleonic wars.
Interesting. And according to I think @Malmesbury someone ran out of soldiers in WWI.
We shall see whether Russia in this case runs out of soldiers because of the population pyramid.
Again, IIRC UK and France were getting very close to the bottom of the barrel for manpower by 1918. The Germans were starting to conscript teenagers and old men. Then the Americans started turning up.
Quite a few historians* suggest that the Michael Offensive was the Last Push before Germany's manpower started to decline and the Allies got their massive boost from the Americans.
This was also the basis for the popular thesis in the inter-war period that if the Americans had stayed out, there would have been a mutual peace due to exhaustion on both sides of men and material.
*Backed by statements made by people in the German High Command.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
China might seek ways to slip help to Russia through back door routes (perhaps turning a blind eye to sympathetic African and Asian countries bunging weaponry to Putin, and then backfilling the third parties' armaments with cut-price exports,) but I don't see Xi going all in and siding with Putin. China is economically vastly stronger than Russia but it's also got plenty of its own problems - not least the economic fallout of the pandemic, and the need to confront the same demographic timebomb as the West at a point when much of the country is still developing - which will be made infinitely worse by a catastrophic economic schism with most of the democratic world, which is a likely consequence of their attempting openly to help Russia to beat Ukraine. Russia isn't worth that much to the Chinese - especially since they know perfectly well that Russia itself is under no threat, only some of its ill-gotten gains. I don't see them taking the leap.
SNP supporter pictured in photos with SNP politicians? Doesn't sound like a big story. There must be many thousands of supporters who have selfies of themselves with politicians they've managed to get close to.* Some of them will be oddballs or worse.
* didn't HYUFD post one of him with Michael Gove after he spotted Gove in the street somewhere?
ETA: HYUFD as an example of selfie with politician, not suggesting he's an oddball or worse (he's normal enough, I think - or, at least, as the medical term goes, 'normal for PB' )
Nice to see some common sense and basic analysis. I'd want you as a referee if I were a journal editor.
Talking about normal for PB, or at least internet politics, there was that SNP staffer astounded that Wings over Scotland had posted the Indian Council thing and convinced it was infallible evidence that Rev Wings was in on this Tory conspiracy, only he left out the Tory bit. Of course Wings would post *anything* like that without being asked. I mean, it was convincing enough for our Scotch experts to be absolutely convinced. Which must say something about Eabhal and me.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
(a) It's a hell of a lot easier to fight a defensive war than an offensive one (b) Russia's population pyramid looked rather different in 1939 than it does in 2023 (c) Russia was only able to fight then because it was supplied by the West
I expected Russia to win the war. Or at least, I expected them to occupy the country East of the Dnieper. And that, I thought, would be the easy bit. Because the initial invasion is usually the easy bit, and it is the occupation - and the slow attrition that comes with it - that kills you.
The nation, both Putin and the population, doesn't seem to be in the mood to call it a day, indeed they believe that the war is an existential fight for their country. That puts the boot on the other foot in your defensive/offensive dynamic because to Russians, they are fighting for their existence.
And I am not sure of the precedent of any country running out of soldiers in war although perhaps Germany in 1945 was an example of this. But Russia is enormous, both its economy and its population and population pyramids aside I can't see them running out of troops in this instance.
My point is there have been umpteen posts forecasting the defeat of Russia (even if anyone knew what they meant by that) for one reason or another and I am wary of such forecasts.
"I am not sure of the precedent of any country running out of soldiers"
- France in the second half of WW1 completely lost the ability to initiate offensive operations - France towards the end of the Napoleonic wars
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Yes, they can switch to make *some* military equipment very quickly. If you claim that's the case for other bits, particularly the high-tech bits, the real force multipliers... then I have grave doubts. Even night-vision equipment might make a massive difference in a battle, and that's apparently quite difficult to make. Or secure, reliable radio systems.
Unless they're storing up vast quantities for a new push (not outside the bounds of possibility), then there are indications that they're already running out of some materials. Which might be one reason why the amount of missiles, and particularly artillery, has reduced. Or why they're resorted to sending people to attack trench lines relatively unsupported.
But just to be clear: I'm not ignoring the possibility that they're storing things up for a big attack sometime soon (and I've consistently said this). However, I'd add that such materials would be well known to the west, and hence Ukraine, as it would be very hard to hide.
I’d like it to be true, but I don’t see how Russia loses this “outright”
Putin has successfully made the war existential. Therefore Russian defeat in Ukraine is the conquest of Russia. That cannot happen because Russian is a great power WITH NUKES. Even if Putin is toppled no replacement will be allowed to negotiate “surrender”
This is Korean War 2.0. Quagmire and Armistice beckons, eventually
Pretty much. Apart from anything else, Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder.
It all ends with partition along a line of control as per Kashmir, with neither side recognising the territory held by the other de jure, but an accommodation being reached de facto. The 80% of Ukraine that remains unoccupied will then be pumped so full of cash and weapons that the cost of trying to resume the war of conquest at some point in the future will be too steep for Putin or his successors to stomach.
This state having been reached, the key challenge will then be to maintain a degree of unity with respect to the ostracism of Russia. Fundamentally, this is a fascist state with a fascist leadership and an overwhelmingly fascist-sympathising population: the existence of a handful of doomed internal dissidents and Pussy Riot does nothing to alter the fact that most Russians back both Putin and his imperial ambitions to the hilt. There will have to be a lot of determined diplomacy to prevent potential backsliders like Italy and Germany from trying to resume antebellum positions on trade and appeasement.
"Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder."
I'm far from convinced that's the case. Look at the Second World War: Germany had over 700,000 men in the Caucus in January 1943; the Soviets had a million. And that was just one front for both. The Ukraine war might be the largest land war we've seen for some years, but it's tiny compared to past wars.
Russia is, and wants to remain, a modern society. The modern world requires so many more skilled people than war did 80 years ago: there are loads of jobs that simply did not exist, but are critical to society and to war. We can't just send the Bevan Boys in to perform them as it takes years to learn the skills.
Then there are the demographic issues mentioned below.
The same also applies to Ukraine, as it happens.
I think this is spot on.
The pool of "talent" for Russia to draw upon is:
Men, aged 17 to 30, in decent physical shape, who don't have important jobs that are required for the war effort, and who haven't fled the country.
Russia's population pyramid is narrowest in the 20-24 (i.e. the prime fighting age) segment.
And a significant chunk of that group has already been called up, has been killed or injured, has fled, or is otherwise unsuitable for fighting.
The Russians have been enlisting prisoners, people who are HIV+ or have tuberculosis. These are not the actions of a country with unlimited cannon fodder.
And even if they did have another million men (which is half the number of Russian men in their early twenties), if they are unsupported, unsupplied, barely trained, and attacking entrenched defenders with Western weapons, then it's not going to end well for them.
At some point, the flow of shells dries up. At some point, too many artillery pieces have been destroyed by HIMARS or just by the warping of barrels from constant firing. At some point, going to the front is considered such a death sentence, that people would fancy their chances fighting the internal police.
At some point, waging offensive war no longer becomes an option for the Russians. Now, it may be they can then defend their positions in a long war of attrition and frozen fronts. Or it may be that long range artillery makes those dug in positions far from Russia and far from working railheads impossible to supply.
And then the war stops, one way or another.
OTOH the Russian population is enormous. Those statistics suggest there are over 12 million men in their thirties alone, most of whom will not be in the limited number of categories (those in reserved occupations, politically well connected, fled abroad, or part of the internal security apparatus,) that would be exempt from being called up and shipped off to be used as target practice by the Ukrainian Army. Forcible conscription, brutalising recruits and using them up to bleed the enemy white is all par for the course in the Russian way of waging war, as is an acceptance of almost limitless suffering on the part of the general population. A wider mobilisation might precipitate a mass revolt, but there's no sign of that happening any time in the near future.
Notably, the Russian government has been ensuring that the conscription carried out so far, falls more heavily upon various regions.
Why are they doing that?
Presumably to pick the low hanging fruit first, but if the Russian government feels compelled to start rounding up young men in the major cities then they will do it. It'll simply result in larger protests and the more widespread use of brutality to suppress them, but since when was Putin or his security apparatus morally troubled about beating up or murdering opponents?
Putin has lost previous elections in Moscow and St Petersburg, and protests that emerge in central Russia are a far bigger risk to the regime than protests in Kyzyl or Ulan Ude.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
I remember PB telling us that Russia was going to run out of missiles in mid September
“Large-scale Russian missile attacks ‘reconnaissance’ for future offensive Ukrainian military says 61 out of 70 cruise missiles shot down as Black Sea launches seen as test of defence infrastructure”
As I understand it - perfectly happy to be corrected by others - the people who look at this in detail have concluded that Russia is now using some types of missiles only as fast as it can produce them, which is to say at a much lower rate then at earlier stages of the war. So, for all intents and purposes, they have run out of these missiles in their stockpile.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He should also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
I remember PB telling us that Russia was going to run out of missiles in mid September
“Large-scale Russian missile attacks ‘reconnaissance’ for future offensive Ukrainian military says 61 out of 70 cruise missiles shot down as Black Sea launches seen as test of defence infrastructure”
As I understand it - perfectly happy to be corrected by others - the people who look at this in detail have concluded that Russia is now using some types of missiles only as fast as it can produce them, which is to say at a much lower rate then at earlier stages of the war. So, for all intents and purposes, they have run out of these missiles in their stockpile.
well the nato secretary general said Ukraine is using up ammunition much faster than nato can supply it. This is critical. As Ukraine uses up ammunition its war effort will be depleted and it will likely have to retreat.
By August 1944, the manpower crisis had come to a head. In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of available replacements had already been dispatched to reinforce the 21st Army Group. By 7 August, a mere 2,654 fully trained and combat-ready men remained in the United Kingdom awaiting deployment. In an effort to maintain the frontline infantry strength across the 21st Army Group, Montgomery made the decision to cannibalise the 59th Division. He sent a telegram to Alan Brooke, which read: "Regret time has come when I must break up one Inf Div. My Inf Divs are so low in effective rifle strength that they can no (repeat no) longer fight effectively in major operations. Request permission to break up at once 59 Div."
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
I remember PB telling us that Russia was going to run out of missiles in mid September
“Large-scale Russian missile attacks ‘reconnaissance’ for future offensive Ukrainian military says 61 out of 70 cruise missiles shot down as Black Sea launches seen as test of defence infrastructure”
As I understand it - perfectly happy to be corrected by others - the people who look at this in detail have concluded that Russia is now using some types of missiles only as fast as it can produce them, which is to say at a much lower rate then at earlier stages of the war. So, for all intents and purposes, they have run out of these missiles in their stockpile.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
(a) It's a hell of a lot easier to fight a defensive war than an offensive one (b) Russia's population pyramid looked rather different in 1939 than it does in 2023 (c) Russia was only able to fight then because it was supplied by the West
I expected Russia to win the war. Or at least, I expected them to occupy the country East of the Dnieper. And that, I thought, would be the easy bit. Because the initial invasion is usually the easy bit, and it is the occupation - and the slow attrition that comes with it - that kills you.
The nation, both Putin and the population, doesn't seem to be in the mood to call it a day, indeed they believe that the war is an existential fight for their country. That puts the boot on the other foot in your defensive/offensive dynamic because to Russians, they are fighting for their existence.
And I am not sure of the precedent of any country running out of soldiers in war although perhaps Germany in 1945 was an example of this. But Russia is enormous, both its economy and its population and population pyramids aside I can't see them running out of troops in this instance.
My point is there have been umpteen posts forecasting the defeat of Russia (even if anyone knew what they meant by that) for one reason or another and I am wary of such forecasts.
Hitherto, people who are pessimistic about Russia's chances have been proved a good deal more right than those who are optimistic.
I'm not sure what being optimistic about Russia's chances means nor anyone on here who has been.
Realistic is the word I think we should all be looking for and plenty on here, and for entirely understandable reasons, have indulged in wishful thinking more than cold, hard analysis, such as anyone on here is really able to undertake.
How's that "to the hilt" definition looking, btw.
Pretty good, I'd say.
The "realists" like John Mearsheimer have had a bad war.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He should also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
LOL. No. You really don't come across as doing, or saying, that.
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
I remember PB telling us that Russia was going to run out of missiles in mid September
“Large-scale Russian missile attacks ‘reconnaissance’ for future offensive Ukrainian military says 61 out of 70 cruise missiles shot down as Black Sea launches seen as test of defence infrastructure”
As I understand it - perfectly happy to be corrected by others - the people who look at this in detail have concluded that Russia is now using some types of missiles only as fast as it can produce them, which is to say at a much lower rate then at earlier stages of the war. So, for all intents and purposes, they have run out of these missiles in their stockpile.
well the nato secretary general said Ukraine is using up ammunition much faster than nato can supply it. This is critical. As Ukraine uses up ammunition its war effort will be depleted and it will likely have to retreat.
US and European production is accelerating at the moment.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
a russian collapse cant happen if ukraine is running out of artillery shells though...i think you are indulging in wishful thinking
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
One should not underestimate his stupidity.
Indeed - his inventiveness in the field of stupid mistakes is breathtaking.
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
Welcome to the site, although you seem to be about 15 hours early this week.
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
One should not underestimate his stupidity.
no one that stupid stays in power in the kremlin for20 years
Forbes is in theory the most dangerous opponent for Unionists, but a very large number of peers don’t want her, and that in itself so destabilising that I struggle to see her being successful even if she wins.
Neither Humza nor Regan look very impressive from afar.
I theorise that the electorate at large would probably prefer Forbes, SNP voters themselves are probably decently split between each of the three candidates, and SNP MSPs would prefer Humza.
At a risk of being a Scotspert, no outcome here looks good. A Sturgeon post 24 is surely possible.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
a russian collapse cant happen if ukraine is running out of artillery shells though...i think you are indulging in wishful thinking
i honestly think the problem is some on this forum have comfortable lives and are looking for a bit of excitement....maybe standing in a trench surrounded by mud and freezing to death will cure them of their delusions
i honestly think the problem is some on this forum have comfortable lives and are looking for a bit of excitement....maybe standing in a trench surrounded by mud and freezing to death will cure them of their delusions
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
i honestly think the problem is some on this forum have comfortable lives and are looking for a bit of excitement....maybe standing in a trench surrounded by mud and freezing to death will cure them of their delusions
Alternatively perhaps the world would be better if Ukrainians and Russians could have comfortable lives too and the problem is Putins delusions that Ukraine is Russia?
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
a russian collapse cant happen if ukraine is running out of artillery shells though...i think you are indulging in wishful thinking
Fuck off troll.
no engagement in the argument...yet you are a highly paid guy in new york....no wonder we in the west are in trouble when people like you rise so high
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
i honestly think the problem is some on this forum have comfortable lives and are looking for a bit of excitement....maybe standing in a trench surrounded by mud and freezing to death will cure them of their delusions
Alternatively perhaps the world would be better if Ukrainians and Russians could have comfortable lives too and the problem is Putins delusions that Ukraine is Russia?
This one is a concern troll. If only we turned our backs on the Ukrainians, all the killing would end.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
casualities in ukraine are enormous now and increasing....families torn asunder whilst armchair generals call for war from the safety of their keyboards...most havent even taken in ukraine refugees thats how much they care
The Russian mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin often brags about his supposedly fearless exploits on Ukraine’s battlefields, but his most reckless manoeuvre may have been at home: flying too high in the Kremlin.
For months, the founder of the Wagner group has been sparring with Russia’s military over a series of calamitous defeats in Ukraine, in what has become an epic Moscow power struggle over the war.
But in recent days Prigozhin has resorted to increasingly angry rants, a sign of what Kremlin watchers see as his waning clout in Vladimir Putin’s inner circle as the defence establishment closes ranks and reasserts its dominance.
I’d like it to be true, but I don’t see how Russia loses this “outright”
Putin has successfully made the war existential. Therefore Russian defeat in Ukraine is the conquest of Russia. That cannot happen because Russian is a great power WITH NUKES. Even if Putin is toppled no replacement will be allowed to negotiate “surrender”
This is Korean War 2.0. Quagmire and Armistice beckons, eventually
Pretty much. Apart from anything else, Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder.
It all ends with partition along a line of control as per Kashmir, with neither side recognising the territory held by the other de jure, but an accommodation being reached de facto. The 80% of Ukraine that remains unoccupied will then be pumped so full of cash and weapons that the cost of trying to resume the war of conquest at some point in the future will be too steep for Putin or his successors to stomach.
This state having been reached, the key challenge will then be to maintain a degree of unity with respect to the ostracism of Russia. Fundamentally, this is a fascist state with a fascist leadership and an overwhelmingly fascist-sympathising population: the existence of a handful of doomed internal dissidents and Pussy Riot does nothing to alter the fact that most Russians back both Putin and his imperial ambitions to the hilt. There will have to be a lot of determined diplomacy to prevent potential backsliders like Italy and Germany from trying to resume antebellum positions on trade and appeasement.
"Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder."
I'm far from convinced that's the case. Look at the Second World War: Germany had over 700,000 men in the Caucus in January 1943; the Soviets had a million. And that was just one front for both. The Ukraine war might be the largest land war we've seen for some years, but it's tiny compared to past wars.
Russia is, and wants to remain, a modern society. The modern world requires so many more skilled people than war did 80 years ago: there are loads of jobs that simply did not exist, but are critical to society and to war. We can't just send the Bevan Boys in to perform them as it takes years to learn the skills.
Then there are the demographic issues mentioned below.
The same also applies to Ukraine, as it happens.
I think this is spot on.
The pool of "talent" for Russia to draw upon is:
Men, aged 17 to 30, in decent physical shape, who don't have important jobs that are required for the war effort, and who haven't fled the country.
Russia's population pyramid is narrowest in the 20-24 (i.e. the prime fighting age) segment.
And a significant chunk of that group has already been called up, has been killed or injured, has fled, or is otherwise unsuitable for fighting.
The Russians have been enlisting prisoners, people who are HIV+ or have tuberculosis. These are not the actions of a country with unlimited cannon fodder.
And even if they did have another million men (which is half the number of Russian men in their early twenties), if they are unsupported, unsupplied, barely trained, and attacking entrenched defenders with Western weapons, then it's not going to end well for them.
At some point, the flow of shells dries up. At some point, too many artillery pieces have been destroyed by HIMARS or just by the warping of barrels from constant firing. At some point, going to the front is considered such a death sentence, that people would fancy their chances fighting the internal police.
At some point, waging offensive war no longer becomes an option for the Russians. Now, it may be they can then defend their positions in a long war of attrition and frozen fronts. Or it may be that long range artillery makes those dug in positions far from Russia and far from working railheads impossible to supply.
And then the war stops, one way or another.
And at that point Putin (or his even madder successor) drops a test nuke over the Black Sea and says Peace Now
Then what? We would agree to a peace, at that point. Probably something like Korea
For your preferred outcome to play out you must assume that Russian will NEVER use nukes even when faced with humiliating defeat. A very very dangerous assumption
That view just means to putin if i rattle my missiles people will go ok then have ukraine....russia drops a nuke in the black sea then so do we to show him where that ends
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
casualities in ukraine are enormous now and increasing....families torn asunder whilst armchair generals call for war from the safety of their keyboards...most havent even taken in ukraine refugees thats how much they care
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
casualities in ukraine are enormous now and increasing....families torn asunder whilst armchair generals call for war from the safety of their keyboards...most havent even taken in ukraine refugees thats how much they care
Seems a bit like a far more primitive ChatGPT with very limited learning set, ripping off Topping's and YBarddCwsc's phrases from earlier.
Any minute now it will mention getting new instructions from the Lubyanka
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
One should not underestimate his stupidity.
no one that stupid stays in power in the kremlin for20 years
I’d like it to be true, but I don’t see how Russia loses this “outright”
Putin has successfully made the war existential. Therefore Russian defeat in Ukraine is the conquest of Russia. That cannot happen because Russian is a great power WITH NUKES. Even if Putin is toppled no replacement will be allowed to negotiate “surrender”
This is Korean War 2.0. Quagmire and Armistice beckons, eventually
Pretty much. Apart from anything else, Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder.
It all ends with partition along a line of control as per Kashmir, with neither side recognising the territory held by the other de jure, but an accommodation being reached de facto. The 80% of Ukraine that remains unoccupied will then be pumped so full of cash and weapons that the cost of trying to resume the war of conquest at some point in the future will be too steep for Putin or his successors to stomach.
This state having been reached, the key challenge will then be to maintain a degree of unity with respect to the ostracism of Russia. Fundamentally, this is a fascist state with a fascist leadership and an overwhelmingly fascist-sympathising population: the existence of a handful of doomed internal dissidents and Pussy Riot does nothing to alter the fact that most Russians back both Putin and his imperial ambitions to the hilt. There will have to be a lot of determined diplomacy to prevent potential backsliders like Italy and Germany from trying to resume antebellum positions on trade and appeasement.
"Russia has an almost limitless supply of cannon fodder."
I'm far from convinced that's the case. Look at the Second World War: Germany had over 700,000 men in the Caucus in January 1943; the Soviets had a million. And that was just one front for both. The Ukraine war might be the largest land war we've seen for some years, but it's tiny compared to past wars.
Russia is, and wants to remain, a modern society. The modern world requires so many more skilled people than war did 80 years ago: there are loads of jobs that simply did not exist, but are critical to society and to war. We can't just send the Bevan Boys in to perform them as it takes years to learn the skills.
Then there are the demographic issues mentioned below.
The same also applies to Ukraine, as it happens.
I think this is spot on.
The pool of "talent" for Russia to draw upon is:
Men, aged 17 to 30, in decent physical shape, who don't have important jobs that are required for the war effort, and who haven't fled the country.
Russia's population pyramid is narrowest in the 20-24 (i.e. the prime fighting age) segment.
And a significant chunk of that group has already been called up, has been killed or injured, has fled, or is otherwise unsuitable for fighting.
The Russians have been enlisting prisoners, people who are HIV+ or have tuberculosis. These are not the actions of a country with unlimited cannon fodder.
And even if they did have another million men (which is half the number of Russian men in their early twenties), if they are unsupported, unsupplied, barely trained, and attacking entrenched defenders with Western weapons, then it's not going to end well for them.
At some point, the flow of shells dries up. At some point, too many artillery pieces have been destroyed by HIMARS or just by the warping of barrels from constant firing. At some point, going to the front is considered such a death sentence, that people would fancy their chances fighting the internal police.
At some point, waging offensive war no longer becomes an option for the Russians. Now, it may be they can then defend their positions in a long war of attrition and frozen fronts. Or it may be that long range artillery makes those dug in positions far from Russia and far from working railheads impossible to supply.
And then the war stops, one way or another.
And at that point Putin (or his even madder successor) drops a test nuke over the Black Sea and says Peace Now
Then what? We would agree to a peace, at that point. Probably something like Korea
For your preferred outcome to play out you must assume that Russian will NEVER use nukes even when faced with humiliating defeat. A very very dangerous assumption
That view just means to putin if i rattle my missiles people will go ok then have ukraine....russia drops a nuke in the black sea then so do we to show him where that ends
then russia launches an emp attack and wipes out our entire electrical grid....back to the early 19th century we go
i honestly think the problem is some on this forum have comfortable lives and are looking for a bit of excitement....maybe standing in a trench surrounded by mud and freezing to death will cure them of their delusions
Putin could do a nuclear test - a high risk strategy. If he successfully causes a big underwater boom, it will be quite sobering, and build prestige. However, if there's nothing more than a faint farting noise, it will make Russia look worse.
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
casualities in ukraine are enormous now and increasing....families torn asunder whilst armchair generals call for war from the safety of their keyboards...most havent even taken in ukraine refugees thats how much they care
It's fortuitous that just when @TOPPING was questioning how desperate Russia's position really is, along comes one of their finest advocates to dispel any doubts that they are truly scraping the barrel.
can anyone engage me on ukraines artillery problem...im still waiting....or maybe the secretary general of nato was lying
You could get a better job. Really you could. Your English isn't that bad, and you're clearly a commited employee. Just that short drive over the border...
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
casualities in ukraine are enormous now and increasing....families torn asunder whilst armchair generals call for war from the safety of their keyboards...most havent even taken in ukraine refugees thats how much they care
Seems a bit like a far more primitive ChatGPT with very limited learning set, ripping off Topping's and YBarddCwsc's phrases from earlier.
Any minute now it will mention getting new instructions from the Lubyanka
Why do Russian trolls always do the dot dot dot thing…is it some kind of Russian social media artefact…or did Pushkin and Tolstoy employ it…it’s quite a giveaway.
can anyone engage me on ukraines artillery problem...im still waiting....or maybe the secretary general of nato was lying
Sadly our conversation doesn't extend to moscow
no arguments you see...people here in the west are getting tired of the war now only 41% support for sending our jets...people on pb are out of step with the great british public im afraid who dont want war
I am in the extraordinary position of letting @Leon speak sense about Russia/Ukraine; an unexpected source of antidote to those "Russia is going to run out of bombs/guns/men/tanks/jets/nuclear bombs/desire to abandon their perceived Mother Russia any minute now" posters.
If you think that Leon is the voice of sanity on a subject then maybe you should begin to worry about your sense of judgement.
I find it deeply surreal but he is right.
You know, because we discussed it at length this morning, and I have had the same discussions for a year now, that I am extremely wary of people calling the imminent demise of Russia and its fighting capabilities.
Since February 25th PB posters have declaimed how Russia is on the verge of defeat.
If Leon now has seen the light (he gets there eventually) then I am happy for him to take up the Sword of the Bleedin' Obvious and point out to anyone (to @rcs1000 of all people, truly we are in a mad world) that Russia has in the past committed great resources to fight wars and seems to be doing the same thing here.
If we assume for a moment that Russia has to rely on its own resources, and does not receive large quantities of supplies from China or elsewhere, then its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire.
Now, I have some worries that I have expressed in the past about the West not increasing the rate of manufacture of ammunition and military equipment, but I think we have much greater potential to increase production than Russia does.
Everything changes if China decides to supply Russia with ammunition and other military equipment. That is essentially the decisive factor in the war, and I've become somewhat alarmed at the western warnings on this point. They sound similar to those made to Russia before the invasion itself a year ago - i.e. futile.
You see this is the type of comment that I take issue with:
" its industrial production potential is fairly modest. Their rate of artillery fire is markedly down compared to the battle over Severodonetsk, because they simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells to maintain that rate of fire"
Jeez I only listened to one of those (excellent) Ukraine podcasts on the BBC (?) where whichever expert it was (I know) said that the Russian economy was such that they can switch industrial production to military uses very quickly and they are not about to run out of any materiel any time soon.
But you, LostPassword, posting on PB, know that their industrial production is "fairly modest" and they "simply can't manufacture enough artillery shells".
This is what I question.
Well I don't claim my information is any better than yours, gleaned as it is from podcasts just the same, but the figures I'd heard was that the Russians were firing less than half the number of artillery shells now, in their current offensive, then they were firing last summer, and that this was because they'd reached the limit of their production capacity with three shifts.
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Then you have not paid attention to my reckoning. I have only ever taken issue with those who have called the imminent victory of Russia more or less from February 25th.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He might also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
Yes, sorry, you are right. Unlike some, you have avoided making any speculative statements. Instead you have nit-picked and carped and criticised only those who support Ukraine, which might make one assume that you support those who think a Russian victory is inevitable, or at least a Ukrainian victory is impossible, but you dare not even state your point of view rather than simply criticise those who venture to have an opinion.
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Yeah soz didn't read all that.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
casualities in ukraine are enormous now and increasing....families torn asunder whilst armchair generals call for war from the safety of their keyboards...most havent even taken in ukraine refugees thats how much they care
It's fortuitous that just when @TOPPING was questioning how desperate Russia's position really is, along comes one of their finest advocates to dispel any doubts that they are truly scraping the barrel.
The lack of capitals reminds me of the joke my stepmother tells.
One day a man goes out to buy meat. After queuing for hours, no meat.
He starts to shout about the Party, the failures of communism etc.
A man comes up to him in a fake leather jacket and says, "Careful, in the old days.. " and makes a pistol shooting gesture.
That evening the wife comes home, to find him sitting in the dark.
"Why are you depressed? No meat again?"
"No", he replies, "it is far worse. They have run out of bullets".
can anyone engage me on ukraines artillery problem...im still waiting....or maybe the secretary general of nato was lying
Sadly our conversation doesn't extend to moscow
no arguments you see...people here in the west are getting tired of the war now only 41% support for sending our jets...people on pb are out of step with the great british public im afraid who dont want war
They are not our jets because moscow pays your wages....when you get a proper job such as telephone sanitiser and pay taxes in the west maybe we will allow you to refer to them as our jets
Why do Russian trolls always do the dot dot dot thing…is it some kind of Russian social media artefact…or did Pushkin and Tolstoy employ it…it’s quite a giveaway.
see also a lack of caps.
The GayTransNATO fiends have stolen all the Caps keys. Sabotage!
I'm personally not seeing much of a mono PB position on how Putin v Ukraine is going to pan out. There's quite a spread of opinion. Fwiw I think it will be a long conflict, will be settled eventually on terms unfavourable to Russia, and the threat of escalation to WW3 is minimal. So, a bad and 2 goods there - if I'm right, which I might easily be.
Why do Russian trolls always do the dot dot dot thing…is it some kind of Russian social media artefact…or did Pushkin and Tolstoy employ it…it’s quite a giveaway.
see also a lack of caps.
still no arguments. Do you think you are worth the money you are paid with such poor reasoning skills that you have....did you get your job through nepotism
I'm personally not seeing much of a mono PB position on how Putin v Ukraine is going to pan out. There's quite a spread of opinion. Fwiw I think it will be a long conflict, will be settled eventually on terms unfavourable to Russia, and the threat of escalation to WW3 is minimal. So, a bad and 2 goods there - if I'm right, which I might easily be.
well that surely mean Russia will have a quick breakthrough and send the west into panic...then it will be time to conscript young men from hampstead who can finally live the dream
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
In which century is this going to happen, if at all? I'm entirely confident that none of us will live to see it.
I don’t believe in some kind of Russian essentialism that says it must remain an eternal enemy.
I’m not saying such a policy must necessarily succeed, but neither do I think it sensible to watch it slip into an unstable satellite of China’s.
1. Russia has been a despotism for almost its entire history, save for an interlude of about a decade at the end of the Cold War. The experiment was unstable and quickly extinguished by the emergence of a new dictatorship. 2. Fascist Germany - leaving aside the fact that it had vastly greater potential for fruitful development in the first place - could be rescued by defeat and occupation. No such remedy exists for Fascist Russia. It will just go on, same as it ever was. It's irredeemable.
There exists no possibility of friendship with an adversary such as that. The best that can be managed is some form of detente, and that in turn can only be achieved through effective containment. A less toxic relationship can be achieved, but only once it is demonstrated to the Russians that we are both unwilling to be bullied by them and too strong to be overcome, brute force being the only language that the Russian ruling class understands and respects.
I took part in the meeting of the G7 leaders. In the first part I thanked the partners for their help during this year. In the second, I presented our priorities to the partners in detail. I am sure that we are able to make progress in the implementation of each of the priorities
💎 A Swarovski crystal-encrusted portrait of Rishi Sunak was sold at auction for £25,000 at a Conservative Party fundraising event last night.
What an odd bunch of people.
it is an expensive dart board I grant you
Who off topicked this? All I meant was that it didn't even make sense as a dartboard. = not advocating use as a dartboard. Dangerous to use as a dartboard. Might bounce off and hit you. Definitely not recommended.
Why do Russian trolls always do the dot dot dot thing…is it some kind of Russian social media artefact…or did Pushkin and Tolstoy employ it…it’s quite a giveaway.
see also a lack of caps.
I know it shouldn't let it, but it really irritates me. An ellipsis (or other three dotty thing) has three dots. Three. And use them sparingly. They aren't sentence connectors.
Why do Russian trolls always do the dot dot dot thing…is it some kind of Russian social media artefact…or did Pushkin and Tolstoy employ it…it’s quite a giveaway.
see also a lack of caps.
I know it shouldn't let it, but it really irritates me. An ellipsis (or other three dotty thing) has three dots. Three. And use them sparingly. They aren't sentence connectors.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
The story of the scorpion and the frog comes to mind on your last point. I don't see a short or medium term future where Russia will integrate with Western nations. There's no will in Russia to do so and the people don't want it.
I imagine that the Chinese would be pretty happy to produce such things anyway. They get a lot of stick, but essentially they're just happy to be economic beneficiaries. Im sure the West can tie up their production for a while.
The chances that China has some sort of emotional alignment with Russia is zero.
Russia’s governance model for centuries has been “strong men surrounding an autocrat” with a strong dose of Orthodox Christianity exceptionalism thrown in. The labels may have changed from aristocrat to oligarch and tsar to president, but the model is essentially the same.
Why do Russian trolls always do the dot dot dot thing…is it some kind of Russian social media artefact…or did Pushkin and Tolstoy employ it…it’s quite a giveaway.
see also a lack of caps.
I know it shouldn't let it, but it really irritates me. An ellipsis (or other three dotty thing) has three dots. Three. And use them sparingly. They aren't sentence connectors.
GW forgot the space in front and the space behind. *PB pedantry*
I think his first impressive performances were in the first season of the Hundred. Would be funny if that much-maligned competition could be given partial credit for the emergence of a great English Test batter.
He was showing great talent in the Blast before that though part of the reason he didn't draw much excitement until later was his breakthrough was in 2020.
And we would still be largely unaware of his talent as a Test batsmen if Bairstow were better at golf.
A year ago I would have said 'How the hell do you break your leg playing golf', but as a year ago I managed to break both legs, one spectacularly, while just walking, I'm now surprised he didn't manage both arms as well.
How did you manage it, as a matter of interest ? Something I’d like to avoid, if at all possible.
Just went over on my ankle. Not much you can do to avoid it I'm guessing. Not an unknown combination of breaks either apparently. The leverage snapped the tibia at the knee and ankle and the Fibula half way down. I broke one of the bones in my other foot. The one the footballers always break, so trivial. The ligaments went completely between the tibia and fibula hence the fibula breaking as well. The tibia had to be screwed onto the fibula to bring it back into position and the bottom of the tibia had to be screwed back on. The other 3 breaks were left to heal by themselves in the cast.
All good now.
@Nigelb There is something you can do about it. Part of my physio at the latter end of sorting it out was to stand on one leg Apparently all the readjusting you do to maintain your balances builds up all the little muscles which in turn may prevent you going over on an ankle in the first place. At least that is what they told me.
Thanks. Will incorporate that in daily routine when I brush my teeth.
Leon- the war is not existential for Russia in any meaningful sense. That's just what people are being told right now. The amount of territory Ukraine is looking to seize back is equivalent to 0.6% of Russia's total land area. Some may have celebrated the re-capture of Crimea but was Russia burning with injustice prior to 2014 about Crimea being a part of an independent Ukraine? No. There were no territorial disputes in the Donbass. So how can this conflict credibly be existential for Russia? Such a mindset is paper thin. Existential for Putin it may be which is an important point but slightly different.
Let us also consider what is Russia's own best interest? What does Russia gain by occupying that extra 0.6% of its land mass? Almost nothing. However as long as it insists on keeping it, Russia loses any chance to rebuild its relationship with its nearest neighbour. With the western world. Getting sanctions removed. Now countries don't always act in their own best interests but over time they might learn.
I actually think the pb debate on Ukraine has been quite reasonable. Forthright and impassioned but that is hardly surprising given the issue we are dealing with. Certain other topics seem to be much more effective at bringing out the worst in people.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
There's a contradiction between saying we shouldn't humiliate Russia but bring it into Western structures, because from the perspective of Russians like Putin, that's precisely the scenario they regard as humiliating.
interestingly those who say russia hasnt done anything today so is running out of missiles....come on do you think putin would be so stupid as to do such an obvious move
Yeah, no way Putin would do anything stupid, like allowing his best paratroops to be slaughtered in Kiev on day one of the war.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
The story of the scorpion and the frog comes to mind on your last point. I don't see a short or medium term future where Russia will integrate with Western nations. There's no will in Russia to do so and the people don't want it.
There might be no will today, but there could be tomorrow. Similar comments were made about Prussian militarism after WW2.
Russia is not Germany, but ultimately I think the emerging geopolitics of this century calls for efforts to bring Russia into “our side”. I think it’s also now recognised in the West that Putin’s actions today stem to some extent from our failures in the 1990s.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
a russian collapse cant happen if ukraine is running out of artillery shells though...i think you are indulging in wishful thinking
Putin could do a nuclear test - a high risk strategy. If he successfully causes a big underwater boom, it will be quite sobering, and build prestige. However, if there's nothing more than a faint farting noise, it will make Russia look worse.
Quite:
There's also the issue that use of nukes is undoubtedly China's red line for implicit Russian support. If Russia uses nukes, it cements the fact that only with nukes can a country be safe from its neighbors, and essentially guarantees that Taiwan, Japan and South Korea will become nuclear powers.
Comments
We shall see whether Russia in this case runs out of soldiers because of the population pyramid.
Edit: you ARE @Malmesbury. Can I claim my £5?
FWIW I have earned my modest living through analyzing the politics, economics and businesses (and history) of the Central and Eastern Euopean region for the past thirty five years, and I do speak some of the languages. Also, of course I have been largely based in Tallinn for the past decade. Perhaps I may sound more assertive in my conclusions than my more academic colleagues would permit themselves, but on the other hand I am paid to have an opinion.
While the short character limit does not permit too many caveats in exploring what is a very complicated situation, you are right to remind me that I maybe don´t show enough of my working to explain myself properly.
“Large-scale Russian missile attacks ‘reconnaissance’ for future offensive
Ukrainian military says 61 out of 70 cruise missiles shot down as Black Sea launches seen as test of defence infrastructure”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/10/wave-of-russian-missile-attacks-on-ukraine-reconnaissance-for-future-offensive?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
https://www.thescottishsun.co.uk/news/10269576/kate-forbes-stalker/
* didn't HYUFD post one of him with Michael Gove after he spotted Gove in the street somewhere?
ETA: HYUFD as an example of selfie with politician, not suggesting he's an oddball or worse (he's normal enough, I think - or, at least, as the medical term goes, 'normal for PB'
I don't claim to have infallible information. I make my judgements based on the best available information that I have.
We can see that there are limits on Russian military production capability, because we don't see a large supply of new tanks, or armoured personnel carriers - or indeed artillery shells - reaching the front lines. Why is the head of Wagner complaining about "shell hunger" if it is so easy for Russian industrial production to switch to military uses?
These are the sorts of questions I ask myself when I try to reconcile the often contradictory pieces of information that I read and hear. Sure, I might get it wrong - I think I've always been willing to admit when I've got things wrong on pb.com over the years.
You, apparently, know better than all of us. But I'm pretty sure by your reckoning Ukraine should have lost several times over by now.
Quite a few historians* suggest that the Michael Offensive was the Last Push before Germany's manpower started to decline and the Allies got their massive boost from the Americans.
This was also the basis for the popular thesis in the inter-war period that if the Americans had stayed out, there would have been a mutual peace due to exhaustion on both sides of men and material.
*Backed by statements made by people in the German High Command.
Talking about normal for PB, or at least internet politics, there was that SNP staffer astounded that Wings over Scotland had posted the Indian Council thing and convinced it was infallible evidence that Rev Wings was in on this Tory conspiracy, only he left out the Tory bit. Of course Wings would post *anything* like that without being asked. I mean, it was convincing enough for our Scotch experts to be absolutely convinced. Which must say something about Eabhal and me.
- France in the second half of WW1 completely lost the ability to initiate offensive operations
- France towards the end of the Napoleonic wars
Unless they're storing up vast quantities for a new push (not outside the bounds of possibility), then there are indications that they're already running out of some materials. Which might be one reason why the amount of missiles, and particularly artillery, has reduced. Or why they're resorted to sending people to attack trench lines relatively unsupported.
But just to be clear: I'm not ignoring the possibility that they're storing things up for a big attack sometime soon (and I've consistently said this). However, I'd add that such materials would be well known to the west, and hence Ukraine, as it would be very hard to hide.
I have always said these things are messy, uncertain, and unpredictable.
I have certainly called people out, although it is a tiring process, when they declaim that because they think Russia should lose all territory up to and including the Crimea, that they will lose all territory up to and including the Crimea. It is following an understandable Historical Determinism fallacy on their part. Because Russia is the "bad guys" and we are the "good guys" we will win.
And early on I gently pointed out that Putin had learned from the West that might is right when he invaded as he looked on as the West conducted illegal invasions and noted that no one really did anything about it. He should also perhaps have noted that those invasions were ultimately unsuccessful but who knows, perhaps he made a distinction between, say Iraq, which wasn't threatening the US, and NATO, which he believes threatens Russia and ploughed on anyway. Add his maniacal desire to recreate an historic Russia which dominates Eastern Europe and you have the current situation.
And even to try to understand the motives for Putin's actions will draw charges of Putin sympathiser or similar.
It is curious if, as I said, understandable.
By August 1944, the manpower crisis had come to a head. In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of available replacements had already been dispatched to reinforce the 21st Army Group. By 7 August, a mere 2,654 fully trained and combat-ready men remained in the United Kingdom awaiting deployment. In an effort to maintain the frontline infantry strength across the 21st Army Group, Montgomery made the decision to cannibalise the 59th Division. He sent a telegram to Alan Brooke, which read: "Regret time has come when I must break up one Inf Div. My Inf Divs are so low in effective rifle strength that they can no (repeat no) longer fight effectively in major operations. Request permission to break up at once 59 Div."
Russia has money and is importing missiles. There
NowI’m going to watch “The Empress”
Later
https://twitter.com/ShaykhSulaiman/status/1628831636769976322?s=20
The "realists" like John Mearsheimer have had a bad war.
For my money, while the overall consensus continues to be for a long-running grind, there are enough straws in the wind to entertain the prospect of a possible “early” (ie 2023) Russian collapse.
I do find the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument compelling. No-one wins long term by humiliating Russia. Defeat is humiliation enough.
I do favour a return to 1991 borders, but I can see a decent case for the resumption of the Kharkiv Pact allowing for Russian naval in Sebastopol, a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, and perhaps even some special status for Crimea and the Donbas, along the lines of Northern Ireland for example.
Long-term, our policy should aim to bring Russia into Western economic, political, and defence structures.
Anyway, swimming awaits. Have fun!
because you won't say, I can only guess based on what you criticise, but you give every appearance of thinking that a Ukrainian victory - or even a Ukrainian advance on the current front lines - is so unlikely that it would be best not attempted, and that any price should be paid to bring the war to a swift conclusion on whatever terms Russia deigns to name.
If you don't think this, then you have a very strange way of expressing yourself. Whether a Ukrainian victory ultimately proves to be beyond them, or not, providing as much support to Ukraine now as possible will make the Ukrainian position stronger in the negotiations when they happen, and it is surely better for us that the position of largely democratic, rules of war-abiding Ukraine, is as strong as possible at that point, rather than that the position of the Russian dictatorship, content to see Ukrainian civilians tortured and murdered is relatively strengthened by our lack of support for Ukraine.
So just what is your beef exactly?
Neither Humza nor Regan look very impressive from afar.
I theorise that the electorate at large would probably prefer Forbes, SNP voters themselves are probably decently split between each of the three candidates, and SNP MSPs would prefer Humza.
At a risk of being a Scotspert, no outcome here looks good. A Sturgeon post 24 is surely possible.
Now back to the Lubyanka for my latest briefing.
My beef is with the PB Armchair General cohort indulging in wish fantasies and wholly speculative bollocks.
But pls have the last word as I think I've done quite enough PB for today so enjoy.
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The Russian mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin often brags about his supposedly fearless exploits on Ukraine’s battlefields, but his most reckless manoeuvre may have been at home: flying too high in the Kremlin.
For months, the founder of the Wagner group has been sparring with Russia’s military over a series of calamitous defeats in Ukraine, in what has become an epic Moscow power struggle over the war.
But in recent days Prigozhin has resorted to increasingly angry rants, a sign of what Kremlin watchers see as his waning clout in Vladimir Putin’s inner circle as the defence establishment closes ranks and reasserts its dominance.
https://www.ft.com/content/ce9723c7-d7e6-4f74-b50e-d145ab8bd5df
Any minute now it will mention getting new instructions from the Lubyanka
I’m not saying such a policy must necessarily succeed, but neither do I think it sensible to watch it slip into an unstable satellite of China’s.
see also a lack of caps.
One day a man goes out to buy meat. After queuing for hours, no meat.
He starts to shout about the Party, the failures of communism etc.
A man comes up to him in a fake leather jacket and says, "Careful, in the old days.. " and makes a pistol shooting gesture.
That evening the wife comes home, to find him sitting in the dark.
"Why are you depressed? No meat again?"
"No", he replies, "it is far worse. They have run out of bullets".
💎 A Swarovski crystal-encrusted portrait of Rishi Sunak was sold at auction for £25,000 at a Conservative Party fundraising event last night.
What an odd bunch of people.
2. Fascist Germany - leaving aside the fact that it had vastly greater potential for fruitful development in the first place - could be rescued by defeat and occupation. No such remedy exists for Fascist Russia. It will just go on, same as it ever was. It's irredeemable.
There exists no possibility of friendship with an adversary such as that. The best that can be managed is some form of detente, and that in turn can only be achieved through effective containment. A less toxic relationship can be achieved, but only once it is demonstrated to the Russians that we are both unwilling to be bullied by them and too strong to be overcome, brute force being the only language that the Russian ruling class understands and respects.
I took part in the meeting of the G7 leaders.
In the first part I thanked the partners for their help during this year.
In the second, I presented our priorities to the partners in detail.
I am sure that we are able to make progress in the implementation of each of the priorities
https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1629169360911859712?s=20
LAB: 46% (+1)
CON: 29% (=)
LDM: 9% (=)
RFM: 6% (=)
GRN: 4% (=)
Via @BMGResearch, 21-23 Feb.
Changes w/ 24-26 Jan.
https://twitter.com/ElectionMapsUK/status/1629172886974914562
Only 17 points ahead with BMG.
They’re being produced in a NATO member:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-launches-joint-artillery-shell-production-with-nato-country-2023-02-15/
I hope that puts your mind at ease….
An ellipsis (or other three dotty thing) has three dots. Three. And use them sparingly. They aren't sentence connectors.
The chances that China has some sort of emotional alignment with Russia is zero.
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Story_of_Russia.html
Russia’s governance model for centuries has been “strong men surrounding an autocrat” with a strong dose of Orthodox Christianity exceptionalism thrown in. The labels may have changed from aristocrat to oligarch and tsar to president, but the model is essentially the same.
Will incorporate that in daily routine when I brush my teeth.
Let us also consider what is Russia's own best interest? What does Russia gain by occupying that extra 0.6% of its land mass? Almost nothing. However as long as it insists on keeping it, Russia loses any chance to rebuild its relationship with its nearest neighbour. With the western world. Getting sanctions removed. Now countries don't always act in their own best interests but over time they might learn.
I actually think the pb debate on Ukraine has been quite reasonable. Forthright and impassioned but that is hardly surprising given the issue we are dealing with. Certain other topics seem to be much more effective at bringing out the worst in people.
In a way.
Russia is not Germany, but ultimately I think the emerging geopolitics of this century calls for efforts to bring Russia into “our side”. I think it’s also now recognised in the West that Putin’s actions today stem to some extent from our failures in the 1990s.
The first is climate change.
The second is competition between the USA (or the West), and China.
It seems to me that Russia is important on both those dimensions.
There's also the issue that use of nukes is undoubtedly China's red line for implicit Russian support. If Russia uses nukes, it cements the fact that only with nukes can a country be safe from its neighbors, and essentially guarantees that Taiwan, Japan and South Korea will become nuclear powers.