Jacob Rees-Mogg, who said that Abbott “does seem to have some promise”, and noted: “It is a curious phenomenon that the names of Australian politicians, are often reminiscent of those of light entertainers from a bygone age.”
@ edmundintokyo "[the US] isn't particularly interested in strengthening the rule of law."
It is, but its own law, not anyone elses'!
Damn, this conversation has taken off just as I need to go out (get a load of hay for the horses). Avery, Edmund and David, I'll try to get back to you comments but it may be after a new thread is up.
@David_herdson - "FWIW, I believe much greater effort should be put into getting international bodies to declaring that a war crime and crime against humanity has occurred in Syria, and to demanding that those individuals responsible face justice in a court of law, and have diplomatic accreditation withdrawn, where relevant. That is a diplomatic process that might just stand a chance of success, while not killing more people in Syria and not improving the chances of some very dodgy rebel groups."
FWIW, I agree with you entirely and would much prefer to see this avenue taken by America, et al'.
Russia has stated that it will support strikes on Assad if conclusive proof emerges of his involvement and the U.N is shown this evidence.And the U.S has not released this proof but will only show it to Congress members.
Judging from the number of No`s in the House of Representatives,it looks like the evidence is not very convincing.
I entirely agree with your analysis of the development of thinking on the right/obligation to intervene in the face of gross violations of human rights. Unfortunately, this thinking has not been paralleled with clear thinking on the legal, moral and political consequences of the UN failing to act to defend its own Charter and rules.
The Security Council concept was pretty much _designed_ to allow the UN to fail to act to defend its own charter and rules, wasn't it? It's a bunch of (then) powerful countries that all have a veto so they can protect their client states.
The obvious solution is more independent international institutions that can act without Security Council vetos, but it's hard to see the US agreeing to those, because the US can wield arbitrary power under the current system, and isn't particularly interested in strengthening the rule of law.
Act with what? The whole reason why the five UNSCPM have vetoes is because they are ones with the power to act. (Though it's worth noting that originally, the UN was meant to have military forces under its own command, rather than acting as a non-paying commissioning agent).
Well, like you say having its own military forces would do the trick. But without going that far you could separate out the ability to make the decision about who deserves to be bombed, then do the bombing without a veto. So in this case you'd put Syria on trial for use of chemical weapons, then if they found them guilty the court would say, "Open season on Syrian air traffic control towers" or whatever, and anyone who wasn't a fan of Syria could carry out the sentence without anybody else having a veto.
Less exotically, prosecutions against individuals instead of countries may be an effective deterrent here, even if they can't be carried out straight away.
I'm still struggling to see how the Syria vote has been some kind of disaster for Ed Miliband. Those not well disposed toward him and his Party have been frantically spinning and blogging over the past ten days to this effect but from where I'm sitting David Cameron instigated the sequence of events and is the principal casualty.
...
Setting aside your points on the economy - it is always good to keep SMukesh waiting - let's address the Miliband on Syria issue.
UK custom and practice is for Prime Ministers to seek cross-party parliamentary endorsement for military action or war. This can be done by forming a National Coalition, as happened during WWII, or, for more limited engagements, by negotiating with opposition leaders in advance of any vote to secure cross-party agreement.
A decision to go to war will always have its dissenters, from individual MPs and even Ministers in both main parties and with smaller parties voting en bloc. But the aim of most PMs is to secure a general consensus of Parliament for action thereby avoiding the exposure of political weakness to enemy and ally alike.
This is why Ed Miliband, as a Privy Councillor, was granted access to government intelligence, the reasonings of the National Security Council and Joint Intelligence Committee, as well as the views of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It is also why Miliband was given every opportunity to raise his concerns and requirements and to have his reasonable demands provided for in the government motion put to vote in the house.
Miliband availed himself of all these opportunities and courtesies and even issued a press release affirming his support in principle for the government two days before the vote.
Miliband then met resistance from his shadow cabinet, with threats of resignation and much division within his party on support for the government motion. Instead of informing Cameron that he could not muster wide support from his party for the government motion, he sought to have his cake and eat it. He divided the House by introducing an opposition amendment and threatened that, if the Coalition government did vote with for his amendment, his party would oppose the government motion. And this applied even though there was no substantive difference between the provisions of the government motion and the opposition amendment.
What Miliband did was divide the House on a matter of national security and international foreign policy, antagonising the country's closest ally and making the country look weak and indecisive throughout the international community. And he did this whilst giving the impression in public that he supported the government's position on all but minor details of process and timing.
Basically Ed Milband sacrificed the interests of the country on the altar of domestic party unity and advantage. He showed himself to be opportunistic, indecisive, unreliable and dishonest in the process.
This is not to say that Cameron did not make his own mistakes. But failure to whip his members effectively on a crucial vote in the national interest is a small failing when compared to the [in]actions of Miliband.
Comments
It is, but its own law, not anyone elses'!
Damn, this conversation has taken off just as I need to go out (get a load of hay for the horses). Avery, Edmund and David, I'll try to get back to you comments but it may be after a new thread is up.
Judging from the number of No`s in the House of Representatives,it looks like the evidence is not very convincing.
Evening, all.
Less exotically, prosecutions against individuals instead of countries may be an effective deterrent here, even if they can't be carried out straight away.
UK custom and practice is for Prime Ministers to seek cross-party parliamentary endorsement for military action or war. This can be done by forming a National Coalition, as happened during WWII, or, for more limited engagements, by negotiating with opposition leaders in advance of any vote to secure cross-party agreement.
A decision to go to war will always have its dissenters, from individual MPs and even Ministers in both main parties and with smaller parties voting en bloc. But the aim of most PMs is to secure a general consensus of Parliament for action thereby avoiding the exposure of political weakness to enemy and ally alike.
This is why Ed Miliband, as a Privy Councillor, was granted access to government intelligence, the reasonings of the National Security Council and Joint Intelligence Committee, as well as the views of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It is also why Miliband was given every opportunity to raise his concerns and requirements and to have his reasonable demands provided for in the government motion put to vote in the house.
Miliband availed himself of all these opportunities and courtesies and even issued a press release affirming his support in principle for the government two days before the vote.
Miliband then met resistance from his shadow cabinet, with threats of resignation and much division within his party on support for the government motion. Instead of informing Cameron that he could not muster wide support from his party for the government motion, he sought to have his cake and eat it. He divided the House by introducing an opposition amendment and threatened that, if the Coalition government did vote with for his amendment, his party would oppose the government motion. And this applied even though there was no substantive difference between the provisions of the government motion and the opposition amendment.
What Miliband did was divide the House on a matter of national security and international foreign policy, antagonising the country's closest ally and making the country look weak and indecisive throughout the international community. And he did this whilst giving the impression in public that he supported the government's position on all but minor details of process and timing.
Basically Ed Milband sacrificed the interests of the country on the altar of domestic party unity and advantage. He showed himself to be opportunistic, indecisive, unreliable and dishonest in the process.
This is not to say that Cameron did not make his own mistakes. But failure to whip his members effectively on a crucial vote in the national interest is a small failing when compared to the [in]actions of Miliband.